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employee relationship and contravening its rules in indulging in the joint activity of
riding, the parties enter into a new relationship, which may be termed a driver-guest
relationship. The driving of the car has become just as much the affair of the driverguest relationship as of the driver-employer relationship. Therefore, the guest, being
injured in the course of the activity of his relationship as a result of the negligence of
the other party, has no grounds for setting the cost of the injury at the door of a third
person whose business rules he is helping break merely because the activity was also in
the course of that third person's business. Practically, the distinction suggested is
amply justified. Express orders from the employer to the driver will usually be sufficient to eliminate known trespassers. But the fact that an invitee relationship exists
between the driver and his passenger demonstrates that such orders have been futile.
The employer then has no control except the threat of discharge, and, since such unauthorized invitations are extremely common, employers are loath to make this threat.
The validity of the theory will be tested if a case arises in which an unauthorized invitee
is injured through the negligence of a servant other than the one who extended the
invitation. The employer should be held responsible.
This argument, however, rests upon a knowledge in the passenger that the rules of
the employer-driver relationship are being broken. In the usual case the driver will not
have authority to invite guests, and the courts have created a presumption to that
effect, at least for trucks. O'Leary'v. Fash, 245 Mass. 123, 14o N.E. 282 (1923); Gruber
v. Cater Transfer Co., 96 Wash. 544, 165 Pac. 491 (1917). But where the invitation is
within the actual authority of the driver, the rules are not being broken, and where
it is within the apparent authority, the passenger will reasonably suppose that they
are not. In either event the trip has ceased to be a joint transgression upon the rights
of the employer, the passenger has become a licensee, and the employer should be held
upon the familiar principle of respondeat superior. Barry v. N.Y.C.& H.R.R.R.Co., 92
N.Y. 289 (1883). In the principal case actual authority to carry passengers could be
deduced from the acquiescence of the employer in previous invitations in spite of the
express rule to the contrary; apparent authority, from the passenger's point of view,
arose out of his observation of such previous acts. Under the theory here expressed the
court was correct in insisting upon the immunity of the employer unless there was
actual or apparent authority for the invitation.
Agency-Respondeat Superior-Liability of Employer to Wife of Servant for
Injuries Caused by Servant's Negligence-[Minnesota].-The defendant, a used car
dealer, invited the plaintiff and her husband to test a car offered for sale by him. The
plaintiff was injured as a result of her husband's negligent driving. A Minnesota
statute provides that any person operating a motor vehicle with the consent of the
owner is deemed an agent of the owner in case of accident. 3 Mason's Minn. Stat.
§ 2720-104 (supp. 1934). The wife sued the owner as the principal of her negligent
husband. Held, the disability of the plaintiff to sue her husband did not bar an action
against the principal of her husband. Miller v. Tyrholm & Co., 265 N.W. 324 (Minn.
1936).
The purpose of the statute was to afford protection against financially irresponsible
drivers. Since passengers are often acquainted with the skill and resources of the driver
and can protect themselves by declining to ride, the statute might have been construed
as protecting only pedestrians, who cannot effectively protect themselves. Three con-
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siderations make this interpretation untenable: (i) the difficulty of determining the
extent of the knowledge of a given passenger; (2) previous Minnesota decisions extending the protection of the family automobile doctrine to the automobile guest (Nicol v.
Geitler, 188 Minn. 69, 247 N.W. 8 (1933)); (3) the use of agency language in the statute.
By construing the statute as it did the court raised the problem of whether, under
the doctrine of respondeatsuperior,a master may be held liable even though the servant
is immune. With the exception of cases involving a marital relationship between the
servant and his victim, no case has been found where the master has been held liable
despite the servant's immunity. The cases in which the master has been held liable
although his servant had the benefit of a covenant not to sue are not in point. But see
Schubert v. Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N.Y. 253, 256, 164 N.E. 42, 43 (1928). These cases
merely hold that a release of the agent from admitted liability does not immunize the
master. The requirement that the agent must be liable before respondeatsuperiorwill
operate generally has a practical justification. When the servant's negligence renders
the master liable to a stranger, the servant will be liable to the master. Consequently,
the imposition of liability upon the master when the agent is not liable would collide
with whatever policy produced the agent's immunity. Although aware of this inconsistency the majority of courts, following the Schubert case, have imposed liability upon
the master when faced with the problem of the instant case. Poulinv. Graham, 102 Vt.
307, 149 Ad. 698 (1929); Chase v. New Hampshire Material Corp., iii Conn. 277, 150
At. 107 (1930). Contra, Emerson v. Western Seed Co., 116 Neb. 18o, 216 N.W. 297
(1927); Sacknoff v. Sacknoff, 131 Me. 280, 16I Ad. 669 (1932). These courts argue that
the immunity of the agent, being merely "procedural," does not extend to the master
who must therefore answer for the "wrong" of the agent. See Schubert v. Schubert
Wagon Co., 249 N.Y. 253, 256, 164 N.E. 42, 43 (1928). Cf. Kingman v. Frank,33 Hun
(N.Y.) 471 (1884) (creditor may garnish debt owed by wife to husband for services
even though husband's claim is not enforceable against the wife); Mertz v. Mertz,
3 N.E.'(2d) 597 (N.Y. 1936) (wife negligently injured by her husband in state A which
allows tort actions between husband and wife, denied recovery against husband in
state B which does not permit such actions). But the view that there is a procedural
disability arising out of the marital relationship is inconsistent with decisions that a
married woman may sue her husband for invasion of her separate property rights
(Wood v. Wood, 83 N.Y. 575 (i88i); 3 Vernier, American Family Laws 271 (1935)); as
well as with decisions that after divorce a wife has no action for injuries committed
during coverture. Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304 (1877); Stron v. Strom, 98 Minn. 427,
107 N.W. 1047 (igo6). This view is also inconsistent with the vanishing notion that
husband and wife are a single entity. See Madden, Persons and Domestic Relations
145 (1931). If husband and wife are one legal person, it is arguable that a husband who
negligently injures his wife has no more committed a wrong than if he had negligently
injured himself. Liability may also be imposed by resort to the identity notion. If the
employee's acts are deemed to be those of the employer, the latter would be liable
without regard to any personal immunity in the former. See Schubert v. Schubert Wagon
Co., 249 N.Y. 253, 257, 164 N.E. 42, 43 (1928). But whatever the theoretical justification, since the principal who responds for the agent's act has an action against him,
the plaintiff is permitted to do indirectly what she cannot do directly-impose ultimate liability upon the agent-husband. See Emerson v. Western Seed Co., 1i6 Neb. i8o,
184, 216 N.W. 297, 298 (1927). This is inconsistent with the notion that permitting
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tort actions between husband and wife will disturb domestic relations. But see McCurdy, Torts between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1030, 1033 (1930).
Courts convinced that the antiquated rule of immunity between husband and wife is
no longer justifiable may indirectly limit its operation by imposing liability upon the
master.
Bankruptcy-Quo Warranto-Possession of State Court Receiver Obtained before
the Four Month Period-[Federal].-The Brictson Manufacturing Company, a
South Dakota corporation, carried on the major part of its business in Nebraska. In
1921 a group of minority stockholders brought a dissolution proceeding in a federal
district court in Nebraska, alleging that the corporation was formed to defraud its
stockholders. The court thereupon appointed a receiver to take possession of all the
assets of the corporation. Although the circuit court of appeals reversed the decision
of the district court and subsequently issued two successive writs of mandamus, the
district court failed to order the receiver to return the property in his possession to the
corporation. Brictson v. Close, 280 Fed. 297 (C.C.A. 8th 1921); Brictson v. Woodrouglh,
284 Fed. 484 (C.C.A. 8th 1922); id., 289 Fed. 1020 (C.C.A. 8th 1923). In 1923 the
Nebraska attorney-general instituted quo warranto proceedings to oust the Brictson
Company from doing business as a foreign corporation in Nebraska. In 1926 the
Nebraska supreme court appointed trustees to take possession of the corporation's
Nebraska assets, distribute them to the corporation's creditors, and, if the corporation
were still solvent, return the balance "to those thereto entitled." State ex rel. Att'yGen'l v. Brictson, 114 Neb. 341, 207 N.W. 664 (1926). The state court trustees' efforts
to obtain this property from the federal receiver culminated in his intervention in the
hearing on the receiver's report, upon which the circuit court revised its mandate and
ordered the receiver to turn over the assets in his possession to the state court trustees
rather than to the corporation. Brictson Mfg. Co. v. Close, 25 F. (2d) 794 (C.C.A. 8th
1928). The assets were actually transferred in September, 1929, after the corporation's
creditors had filed a petition in bankruptcy against the corporation in August.
The trustee in bankruptcy, Engebretson, made several abortive attempts to obtain
the property from the state court trustees before 1933, at which time he unsuccessfully
resorted to a summary proceeding in the bankruptcy court. Marcell v. Engebretson,
74 F. (2d) 93 (C.C.A. 1934); cert. denied, 296 U.S. 579 (1934). The present action is a
plenary suit in equity in which Engebretson as plaintiff claimed: (i) that the previous
decision determined only that the state court trustees had more than a colorable claim;
(2) that the defendants do not hold the property adversely to the corporation; (3) that
therefore, as trustee in bankruptcy, he is entitled to this property as property in the
constructive possession of the bankrupt. Held, the retention of this property by the
federal receiver until after the petition in bankruptcy had been filed was wrongful;
therefore, these assets were in the constructive possession of the state court trustees
from the time of their appointment. This possession being adverse to the corporation
and having commenced more than four months before the filing of the petition, the
state court acquired jurisdiction to administer these assets free from interference by
other courts. Engebretson v. Marcell, 84 F. (2d) 315 (C.C.A. 8th 1936), cert. denied,
Sup. Ct. Serv. 8og, no. 210 (Oct. 12, 1936).
Liens obtained by creditors more than four months before the filing of a petition in
bankruptcy are not voidable under section 67f of the Bankruptcy Act. 30 Stat. 544,

